Vietnam's International Financial Centre has hit an early credibility test.

Decree 329 requires foreign banks applying for a VIFC licence to hold a rating of AA- or higher from S&P or Fitch, or Aa3 or higher from Moody's, with a stable or better outlook. The same decree requires five consecutive years of profit, clean regulatory standing, home-country supervisory cooperation, and minimum asset thresholds of $10 billion for a wholly foreign-owned commercial bank and $20 billion for a foreign bank branch.

The complaint is easy to understand. The rule is high enough to exclude many serious institutions. The AA-/Aa3 floor is currently blocking names such as JPMorgan, MUFG, Bank of America, Bank of China and more than ten other interested foreign institutions, and officials and economists have begun calling for a phased reduction of the threshold.

The instinctive business reaction is predictable: relax the rule, get the names in, build liquidity, create momentum.

That reaction is wrong.

Trusted before busy

Vietnam's financial centre has one job in its first decade. It has to become trusted before it becomes busy.

A financial centre is built on law, supervision, dispute settlement, liquidity, tax design, banking infrastructure and talent. All of that matters. But in the first stage, the market reads one thing more closely than everything else: who gets allowed inside.

Early membership is the signal.

If Vietnam lowers the gate too quickly, it sends a simple message to global capital: the country wants activity badly enough to trade down on quality. That is a bad opening message for a jurisdiction still trying to prove that its financial rulebook can sit beside Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, GIFT City and Seoul.

The argument for relaxation treats membership count as the main KPI. That is the wrong KPI. The first KPI should be institutional reputation.

What the VIFC already has

Ho Chi Minh City has momentum. In GFCI 39, it ranked 84th out of 120 global financial centres, up 11 places from the previous edition, and was listed among 15 centres likely to become more significant. The VIFC has also been given real legal tools: liberalised foreign exchange rules, long tax incentive windows, work-permit relief, expert income tax exemptions, and a controlled fintech sandbox. Vietnam has also created a specialised court system for IFC disputes, with English recognised as a functional court language and foreign judges permitted to sit on tribunals.

Those are serious moves. They show Vietnam understands that a financial centre is legal infrastructure, not a ribbon-cutting ceremony.

The AA- rule should be read in that context. It is part of the same credibility architecture.

The counterargument, and why it fails

The loudest counterargument says the rule is too mechanical. That is true. A credit rating is a blunt filter. It captures sovereign ceiling issues, rating methodology, balance-sheet strength, home-country risk and agency judgment in one public grade. A Japanese megabank can be stronger in practice than its rating implies. A European bank may be globally relevant while sitting one notch below the Vietnamese threshold. A pure AA- cut-off excludes nuance.

But early-stage financial centres do not fail because they were too careful. They fail because they confuse access with trust.

Vietnam's domestic financial history makes this even more important. The country is still rebuilding confidence after years of property-credit stress, corporate bond scandals, bank restructuring, retail investor losses and opaque related-party lending concerns. Foreign executives may like Vietnam's growth story, but their legal, treasury, compliance and risk teams still price institutional uncertainty into every decision. A relaxed banking gate would land inside that existing risk memory.

The VIFC cannot afford its first global impression to be a membership drive.

The Singapore lesson

Singapore offers the better lesson. Its reputation was built through predictability, enforcement and institutional discipline. The latest GFCI data shows how tight competition is at the top: only one rating point separates New York, London, Hong Kong and Singapore. Financial professionals rank predictability as the most important regulatory factor for financial centre development, ahead of speed, flexibility, quality and cost.

Singapore did not become trusted because it was the easiest place to enter. It became trusted because market participants believed the regulator would protect the system, even when that protection was uncomfortable.

Singapore's own recent AML enforcement proves the point. MAS fined nine financial institutions S$27.45 million in 2025 in connection with the 2023 S$3 billion money-laundering case, after identifying weaknesses in customer risk assessment, source-of-wealth checks and suspicious transaction monitoring. That is the financial-centre bargain: access is attractive because the rulebook bites.

Vietnam should absorb that lesson before it chases foreign logos.

The adverse-selection risk

There is also an adverse-selection problem. If a young financial centre offers generous tax terms, looser foreign exchange treatment, sandbox flexibility and relaxed bank entry at the same time, it may attract the exact type of institution that comes for regulatory spread rather than market depth. The highest-quality operators have options. They can wait. The more opportunistic operators move fastest when the gate looks negotiable.

That is the hidden risk in "temporary relaxation." Temporary relaxation often becomes the market's real expectation. Once the first group enters under a softer standard, tightening later becomes politically harder. The government then has to explain why early members received easier treatment while later applicants face a higher bar. A phased system sounds clean in theory. In practice, it creates lobbying rounds, exception requests, grandfathering debates and pressure from every applicant sitting just below the line.

Vietnam has spent years trying to reduce discretion in areas where foreign investors already feel exposed. Replacing one hard rule with case-by-case comfort may look more flexible, but flexibility can become another name for negotiation risk.

The right answer

The better answer is to keep the AA- rule for full banking licences and build narrower channels around it.

Vietnam can create product-specific, ring-fenced permissions for institutions below the AA- threshold. Trade finance, custody partnerships, settlement support, syndicated lending desks, digital asset infrastructure, green finance origination and treasury advisory can each be licensed with capital limits, activity limits, enhanced reporting and domestic-bank pairing. That gives Vietnam access to global expertise without lowering the core bank licence standard.

This is the right policy split: protect the centre's balance-sheet layer, open the service layer carefully.

What this means for operators

For international operators, the signal is clear. Vietnam wants to attract capital, but it is starting to understand that capital also tests institutional seriousness. The VIFC is already offering tax, foreign exchange and dispute-resolution advantages. The AA- rule says the banking layer will be treated as systemic from day one.

For banks below the threshold, the route into Vietnam should run through partnerships, advisory mandates, capital markets work, technology rails and non-balance-sheet services first. For funds and fintech firms, the message is that Vietnam's financial centre will likely become more structured and less permissive than the early hype suggested. For market-entry teams, the operating question should shift from "Can we get in early?" to "Which licensed role can we hold without betting on a rule change?"

Vietnam does need foreign banks inside the VIFC. It needs them for liquidity, credibility, market-making, custody, dollar flows, trade finance and global institutional behaviour. But it needs the right sequence.

First, prove the gate is real. Then widen the corridors around it.

The AA- rule may slow the membership scoreboard. It also protects the one thing Vietnam cannot buy later with tax incentives, launch events or policy speeches: the belief that its financial centre will choose reputation over speed.